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Summary 
The Renewable Energy Directive of 2001 mandated EU member states to develop a system for the 
guarantees of origin (GOs) of renewable electricity. In 2016, this market had an estimated value of 
€120 million per year across the EU, of which €100 million was income for generators of renewable 
electricity. Yet the GO system has received criticism for lacking environmental credibility and having 
little impact. There is specific criticism of the double-counting and negligible impact on new 
renewable generation; an oversupplied market means that there is a very low average GO price 
level. Well-designed reforms could address these weaknesses and provide additional, consumer-
driven future income streams to help realise new renewable energy projects.  
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he European Commission launched the Clean Energy for All Europeans package in 
November 2016, which contains a proposal for a revised Renewable Energy Directive and 
suggested amendments to guarantees of origin (GOs) under Article 19.1 GOs serve as 
proof that the sources (fuels) used to produce the electricity they delivered  correspond to the 
fuel mix under the electricity information label that suppliers must disclose to consumers along 
with the electricity bill.2  
This Policy Insight focuses on the fundamentals of the market for GOs representing renewables-
sourced electricity.3 It raises key questions for the ongoing legislative process leading up to the 
revised Renewable Energy Directive for the 2020s, and concludes that under certain regulatory 
conditions, the GO system can become a useful instrument to empower consumers to render 
the national and EU energy mix more renewable.   
A brief introduction 
A GO is an electronic document that certifies that 1 MWh of energy, mainly electricity, has been 
generated from sources with origin features specified by European Union GO rules legislation.4 
This requires GOs to be issued at the request of producers of electricity from renewable 
sources. Generators sell these GOs directly, or through traders, to suppliers who use them to 
prove the source (fuel) of the renewable electricity they deliver in accordance with the 
electricity information label sent to customers with the electricity bill.5 Suppliers have the legal 
obligation to disclose to consumers the fuel mix of the electricity supplied to them in the 
previous year. For renewable sources, suppliers must prove the renewable origin of the 
                                                        
1 See COM(2016) 767 final/2. Existing legislation on EU GO rules is enshrined in Directive 2009/28/EC repealing 
Directives 2001/77/EC (Renewable Electricity) and 2003/30/EC (Biofuels) and Directive 2012/27/EU. 
2 EU rules for electricity disclosure are stipulated in Directive 2009/72/CE, Article 3 (9).    
3 GOs of electricity from high-efficiency cogeneration plants and of heating and cooling are not considered. 
4 For a renewable electricity GO these features include, inter alia, the renewable energy source used, the identity, 
location, type and capacity of the power plant and a unique identification number. 
5 For more details and further references see: Jaap Jansen, Eleanor Drabik and Christian Egenhofer, “The 
Disclosure of Guarantees of Origin: Interactions with the 2030 Climate and Energy Framework”, CEPS-ECH 
special report No. 149, November 2016, at: 
https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Guarantees%20of%20Origin%20CEPS%20Special%20Report.pdf 
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deliveries of ‘green tariff’ products by using GOs. Typically, generators are the actors on the 
supply side and electricity suppliers on the demand side of the GO market. In some member 
states large companies are allowed to act on the demand side, procuring GOs for their own use 
(to reduce their carbon footprint).    
The market for GOs of renewables-sourced electricity for use in the EU during 2016 was 
estimated to be about 300 million MWh.6 This means that it covers almost one-third of total 
renewable electricity consumption in the EU. Hydropower still makes up the lion’s share of GOs 
used in the EU, with 77% in 2016.7 But the corresponding contribution of other renewables, i.e. 
23%, is rising fast. This also holds true for the overall use of GOs in Europe: AIB statistics indicate 
an annual growth rate of 12.5% during the period 2011-2016.8  
To date, GO prices are low. We estimate that the average GO price in 2016 can be put at 
approximately €0.30 per GO (0.03 €cent per kWh) and €0.75 per GO (0.075 €cent per kWh) for 
hydro GOs and other-renewables GOs respectively.9 The total market value of GOs used in the 
EU in 2016 may therefore have had an order of magnitude of roughly €120 million. Out of the 
total, some €100 million can be seen as an additional income source for renewable 
generators.10 The remaining €20 million are fees and charges, for example, for issuing bodies 
and traders. 
Two main drivers have the potential to substantially increase the average market value of GOs 
and, consequently, the cash flow they deliver to renewable generators. First, especially 
following the Paris Climate Agreement, the appetite of consumers to reduce their carbon 
footprint is increasing. This is particularly the case for business corporations, but also for 
environmentally aware households and local energy communities. Second, several renewable 
technologies achieve rapid cost reductions, e.g. new utility-scale photovoltaic (PV), onshore 
and especially offshore wind projects. GOs could play a major role in closing the narrowing cost 
gap per kWh between power from these sources and power from non-renewable sources.  
                                                        
6 This estimate only refers to renewable electricity GOs cancelled in the EU28, based on the European Energy 
Certificate System (EECS) standard, developed and used by the Association of Issuing Bodies (AIB). This is the most 
available standard in the EU, with oversight of national regulatory agencies in member states where this standard 
has been adopted. In 2016, 10 member states, including the UK and Poland, had not yet designated an issuing 
body adopting the EECS standard for issuing GOs, affecting cross-border GO trade.  
7 Close to 100% of the hydropower GOs represent production from large hydropower stations. Many of these 
stations were commissioned before 1990.  
8 Cancellations in the EU, Switzerland, Norway and Iceland of all EECS-based GOs, including a tiny share for other 
GOs than renewable electricity GOs (such as GOs of nuclear, fossil fuels and green gas energy).   
9 GOs are traded bilaterally and therefore GO price information is largely confidential. These are average figures. 
GOs constitute non-homogeneous environmental products, the market value of which is determined by user-
specific preferences. In some small niche markets prices are as high as 3-5 €/GO to meet demand for locally 
produced wind power or local PV-based electricity. 
10 Assuming transaction costs total on average €0.07 per GO used (€ct 0.007 per kWh of renewable electricity 
consumed).  
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A closer look at some market fundamentals proposals  
Current EU legislation leaves the design of renewable energy and electricity support schemes 
to member states, albeit within an EU framework. Legislation in most member states allows 
the issuance of so-called ‘support GOs’ to generators in their jurisdictions; support GOs are GOs 
of electricity that benefited from a support scheme. This means, in practice, that GOs do not 
incentivise additional renewable generation, even if the GO prices were much higher. The 
situation in Germany is different, however, where no GOs can be issued to generators 
benefiting from the German support scheme. The downside is that there is no EU-wide 
framework, which risks ‘unlevelling’ the playing field for project developers.  
Under the new proposal, the European Commission plans to oblige member states to forbid 
the issuance of support GOs to generators and instead have them issued to a designated 
national authority. This would effectively solve the ‘playing-field’ problem under a number of 
conditions:  
First, there must be clarity on whether the support for renewable generation applies to 
production-related benefits (e.g. feed-in support, green certificates, production-variable tax 
benefits) or to investment subsidies. If the recast Renewables Directive is to stipulate that 
investment subsidies must be included in GOs that cannot be issued to generators, then a clear 
definition of investment subsidies is warranted. Also, whether such an obligation can be 
implemented from an administrative perspective should be considered.11 Investment subsidies 
are much less distortive for both electricity and GO markets. Also with a view to administrative 
implementation, forbidding issuance of GOs to generators only when the generated electricity 
represented by those GOs is supported by a production-related support scheme is a possibility.   
Second, the European Commission proposal to mandate member states to auction support 
GOs, and then to use the auction proceeds as a funding source of their national support scheme 
is questionable. Auctioning raises several issues. A credibility issue arises because of double 
counting the renewable feature of the electricity represented by a support GO. Double uses 
are: i) use by generators of their (justified) claim to the renewable feature to obtain support 
benefits and ii) use of electricity suppliers and business companies who bought support GOs 
on a state auction to make a second (contestable) claim on the renewable feature of the same 
renewable electricity. The environmental integrity of the second claim on the renewable 
electricity feature is supposed to be compromised by the fact that it has already been claimed 
before. That is, the second claim to the renewable feature tends to have no positive 
environmental impact, i.e. more renewable electricity production. Furthermore, auctioning of 
support GOs exacerbates the prevailing oversupply of GOs. A new flow of GOs will be entering 
the GO market, i.e. those on supported electricity that cannot be issued under German national 
legislation. The benefits of auctioning support GOs, i.e. where the auction proceeds can be used 
                                                        
11 Investment support can be difficult to establish/trace. For example, should participation of public financing 
agencies in project finance be considered? And what about subsidies from sub-national authorities, including 
subsidised acquisition or use of public land?  
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as a new and additional funding source for national support schemes, are set to be meagre as 
the prevailing low GO prices will be further reduced by the negative price effect of the proposed 
auctioning measure.  
A better way would be to have the support GOs cancelled by the designated authorities. 
Mandating member states to oblige their competent authorities to cancel the GOs on 
supported energy12 will lead to a separation of GOs as an instrument for consumer disclosure 
purposes and support schemes, thereby potentially avoiding the risk or perception of double 
counting. As a result of having support GOs cancelled – as distinct from bringing them to the 
market through auctioning – the supply of GOs to the market would diminish strongly, 
rendering the GO market less oversupplied. This would increase GO prices, meaning that the 
purchase of a renewable electricity product (for example as a tool to reduce the carbon 
footprint) would come at a non-negligible price premium. The prices for GOs – to demonstrate 
the nature of renewable electricity products – would have to be high enough to entice 
renewable generators to request issuance of GOs instead of applying for the benefits of the 
national support scheme. As project developers (generators) are looking for a relatively stable 
cash flow profile, they may seek to enter into long-term contracts with buyers of electricity plus 
the corresponding GOs. The upshot is that cancelling ‘support GOs’ is likely to have a notable 
upward effect on the production of renewable energy.  
When the costs of consuming premium renewable energy products go up, demand for such 
products will shrink initially. This market volume effect would be mitigated by the narrowing 
cost competitiveness gap between renewable electricity and non-renewable electricity, 
because of technological progress. Furthermore, corporate consumers face surging market 
pressure to render the carbon intensity of their products ever lower. Besides, the overall retail 
market for premium green products is expanding and the number of citizens active in local 
energy communities is rising as well.   
Success will also require that the second reason accounting for the oversupplied market GO 
market be addressed; namely GOs issued to ‘old’ renewable power plants that have already 
been fully depreciated on the balance sheet of the generators concerned, notably large hydro.  
This could be solved by obliging member states to issue to a designated authority those GOs of 
renewable electricity generated by power plants that, at the GO issuing date, were 
commissioned more than a specified number of years, e.g. 25 years, ago.   
Should the GO instrument be discarded?  
The current legislation of the GO instrument leads to an oversupplied GO market and a double-
counting problem. This enables suppliers who want to launch renewable electricity products, 
and corporations seeking to make their electricity demand more renewable, to do so in a legally 
                                                        
12 This can be done in an administratively simple way by ordering the designated authority to immediately cancel 
the support GOs issued to them. Some member states may wish instead to opt for a relatively complex procedure 
to allow for differential contributions made by different consumer categories.   
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correct and cheap but environmentally questionable way that results in little or no extra 
generation of renewable electricity.  
To redress this situation, the following steps should be taken: 
1. EU-wide adoption of the best available harmonised GO standard enabling renewable 
generators to benefit from unhampered cross-border GO trade, such as the EECS (European 
Energy Certificate System) standard.13 
2. ‘Support GOs’ will need to be issued to a designated national authority instead of 
generators, who receive support benefits. The authority has to cancel these GOs. The type 
of support schemes to be associated with support GOs need to be clearly defined. 
Restricting such schemes to production-related support schemes might be considered 
because inclusion of investment subsidies poses significant administrative challenges.14  
3. Mandate member states to introduce a limit on the period during which the generator 
running a renewable electricity installation can request issuing GOs to him, for example 25 
operating years only. GOs of the electricity generated after this period has ended have to 
be issued to the aforementioned designated authority for immediate cancellation. 
In considering these steps, the EU legislative institutions might conclude that GOs have the 
potential to become a welcome consumer-driven financing complement to render renewable 
energy projects viable, notably after 2020.  
Table 1 below summarises and provides further explanation of the pros and cons of possible 
regulatory changes discussed in this Policy Insight.  
  
                                                        
13 See also footnote 6. The European Commission proposes that “Member States and designated competent 
bodies shall ensure that the requirements they impose are compliant with the standard CEN - EN 16325”. See 
COM(2016) 767 final/2, Article 19(6).  
14 To preclude retroactive changes existing long-term corporate power (plus GOs) purchase agreements would 
need to be honoured by way of a derogation to the proposed obligation. New long-term corporate Power 
Purchasing Agreements would need to fall under the obligation. 
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 Table 1. Major effects of three fundamental amendments regarding GOs of supported 
renewable energy and GOs from old installations generating renewable electricity 
Impact on ... Auctioning support GOs by 
designated national 
authority 
Cancelling support GOs 
by the designated 
national authority 
Cancelling old 
plant GOs by the 
designated 
national authority 
Average GO price Downward Upward Upward 
Consumer costs of 
signalling a preference 
for renewable power 
Costs remain negligible Green tariffs to include 
a non-negligible 
premium to render 
additional project 
finance with GOs 
competitive with the 
national production 
support scheme  
Potentially upward  
Renewable power 
generation 
(‘additionality’) 
The negligible impact to 
date will be reduced 
further by more GO 
oversupply 
Significantly positive Significantly 
positive 
Consumer 
transparency 
Reduced: no transparent 
disclosure of renewable 
electricity (RES-E) 
supported by consumer 
surcharge / tax payer, nor 
of additional RES-E 
financed by green tariff 
subscriber (when 
applicable)  
Improved: transparent 
disclosure of both RES-
E financed by 
consumer surcharge / 
tax payer and 
additional RES-E 
financed by a green 
tariff subscriber  
In countries with 
old hydropower 
stations the share 
of hydropower 
disclosed to 
consumers will 
resemble closer 
the share of hydro 
in the national 
electricity 
production mix   
Economic significance 
of GO market 
Will diminish Likely to increase: GO 
price effect poised to 
dominate market 
volume reduction 
Likely to increase: 
GO price effect 
poised to 
dominate market 
volume reduction  
Support funding 
requirements to 
achieve 2030 RES 
target  
Slightly downward: auction 
proceeds to be negatively 
affected by downward GO 
price effect 
Significant downward 
potential: accelerated 
phase-out of support, 
notably to 
technologies with 
currently a low cost 
gap 
Significant 
downward 
potential: 
accelerated phase-
out of support, 
notably to 
technologies with 
low currently a low 
cost gap  
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Credibility of GO 
system 
Contested: alleged double 
counting of the renewable 
feature of supported 
energy + absence of 
‘additionality’ 
Strongly raised: no 
double counting issue 
and significant 
additionality 
Raised by higher 
potential for 
additionality 
Compatibility with 
sound regulatory 
principles 
Cross-subsidisation of grey 
by green tariff consumers.  
Allegedly, the state 
dispossesses title to the 
renewable feature of 
electricity supported by the 
national support scheme 
from the consumers who 
funded this scheme 
Compatible Freedom of 
consumers to 
choose energy 
from old plants 
constrained to 
address – apart 
from zero-
additionality 
concerns – a 
second market 
failure, i.e. supra-
normal profits to 
generators 
concerned 
Note: RES-E stands for electricity from renewable sources of energy. 
